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Abstract 
The Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) theory of belief update has been proposed as a reasonable 
model for revising beliefs about a changing world. However, the semantics of update relies on 
information which is not readily available. We describe an alternative semantical view of update in 
which observations are incorporated into a belief set by: (a) explaining the observation in terms 
of a set of plausible events that might have caused that observation; and (b) predicting further 
consequences of those explanations. We also allow the possibility of conditional expluna~ions. 
We show that this picture naturally induces an update operator conforming to the KM postulates 
under certain assumptions. However, we argue that these assumptions are not always reasonable, 
and they restrict our ability to integrate update with other forms of revision when reasoning about 
action. 
1. Introdnction 
Reasoning about action and change has been a central focus of research in AI for 
many years, dating at least to the origins of the situation calculus [ 201. For example, a 
planning agent must be able to predict the effects of its actions on the world in order 
to verify whether a potential plan achieves a desired goal. Actions effect changes in 
the world, and agents must be able to modify their beliefs about the world to reflect 
such considerations. Furthermore, an agent situated in a dynamic world must be able 
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to reason about changes in the world not simply due to its own actions, but due to the 
occurrence of exogenous events as well. 
One of the most influential theories of belief change has been the ACM theory pro- 
posed by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [ 11. Imagine an agent possesses a 
belief set or knowledge base KB. The AGM theory provides a set of postulates con- 
straining the possible ways in which the agent can change KB in order to accommodate 
a new belief A. Notice that this revision of KB need not be straightforward, for the new 
belief A may conflict with beliefs in KB. It was pointed out by Wmslett [27] that the 
AGM theory is inappropriate for reasoning about changes in belief due to the evolution 
of a changing world. A new form of belief change dubbed update was proposed in full 
generality by Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 161, who provided a set of postulates, distinct 
from the AGM postulates, that characterize this type of belief change. 
Semantically, Katsuno and Mendelzon have shown that belief update can be charac- 
terized by positing a family of orderings over possible worlds, with each ordering being 
indexed by some world. The ordering associated with a specific world can be viewed 
intuitively as describing the most plausible ways in which that world can change. To 
update a knowledge base KB with some proposition A, the worlds admitted by KB are 
each updated by finding the most plausible change associated with that world satisfying 
A (we describe this formally below). As a concrete example, suppose that someone 
observes that the grass in front of her house is wet. She is not sure whether she left her 
book outside on the patio, but concludes that if the book is outside it is wet too. There 
are two possible worlds admitted by her knowledge, 0 and 0 (the book is outside or 
it is not). When the first possibility is updated with the observation of wet grass, a wet 
book is the result. When the second possibility is updated, the book remains dry. The 
conditional belief 0 E W (the book is wet if and only if it was outside) is part of our 
agent’s updated belief set. 
In this paper, we present an abductive model of belief change suitable for updating 
beliefs in response to a changing world. While our semantics induces a class of belief 
change operators that is somewhat more general than Katsuno-Mendelzon (KM) update 
operators, the most compelling aspect of our model is the fact that it breaks the KM 
semantics into smaller, more primitive parts. We argue that such a model provides a 
more natural perspective on belief update in response to changes in the world, and 
exploits information that is more readily available or easily obtainable from users of 
a system. In the following, we use the term update to describe any process of belief 
change used to capture changes in belief due to change in the world (not simply those 
models conforming to the KM postulates). 
In general, we take update to be a two-stage process of explanation followed by 
prediction: first, an agent explains an observation by postulating some plausible event 
or events that could have caused that observation to hold, relative to its initial state 
of knowledge; second, an agent predicts the (further) consequences of these events, 
relative to this initial state. In our example, there are several possible causes of wet 
grass, among them the sprinkler turning on automatically, or rain. If rain is the most 
plausible of these causing events, our agent concludes that everything on the patio 
is wet, including the book if it is out there. Had sprinkler been the most plausible 
explanation, a different conclusion would have been reached: the book would be dry 
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regardless of its location. It is these considerations that allow an agent to determine 
just what changes in the world are most plausible. Intuitively, information about the 
effects of (events, as well as their relative plausibility, will be more readily available or 
easier to assess than a direct ordering of plausibility over possible “evolutions” of the 
world. 
We formalize this notion in an abstract manner obtaining a class of explanation-change 
operators that are similar in spirit and intent to KM update operators, but somewhat more 
general. We note that explanation has often been closely linked with belief revision [ 121. 
Indeed, Boutilier and Becher [5] present a model of abduction where explanations are 
determined by explicit belief revision. Given this connection and the fact that update 
can be viewed as an essentially abductive process, we may also take update to be a 
certain kind of belief revision. This stands in stark contrast with the accepted wisdom 
that update and revision are orthogonal forms of belief change. While we could cast our 
model as al form of belief revision, this would detract from the main point of the paper. 
However, we do elaborate on this connection in the concluding section. 
In Section 2 we review the KM postulates for belief update and the KM semantics. 
In Section 3 we analyze this semantics more closely, and break it into more basic 
elements. We describe our abductive view of update and show its relationship to the 
KM model _ In particular, we show that certain semantic assumptions naturally give rise 
to the KM theory; however, we argue that these assumptions are inappropriate as general 
update principles. We also briefly describe and characterize a special class of update 
operators. In Section 4, we analyze our model more deeply and discuss the connections 
to belief revision. We also argue that proper modification of belief states in response 
to observaltions in dynamic settings involves a combination of belief revision and belief 
update. Finally, we compare our construction to the model of update proposed by de1 
Val and Shoham [ 81. Proofs of the main results can be found in Appendix A. 
2. The semantics of update 
Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 161 have proposed a general characterization of belief 
update. Update is distinguished from belief revision conceptually by viewing update as 
reflecting belief change in response to changes in the world, whereas revision is thought 
to be more appropriate for changing (possibly erroneous) beliefs about a static world. 
Update is described by Katsuno and Mendelzon with a set of postulates constraining 
acceptable update operators and a possible worlds semantics, both of which we review 
here. 
We assume the existence of some knowledge base KB, the set of beliefs held by 
an agent about the current state of the world. We take our underlying logic to be 
propositional, based on a finitely generated language Lcp~. We use W to denote the set 
of possible worlds (or models) suitable for this language. 
If some new fact A is observed in response to some (unspecified) change in the 
world (i.e., some action or event occurrence), then the formula KB o A denotes the 
new belief set incorporating this change. The KM postulates [ 161 governing admissible 
update operators are: 
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(Ul) KBoA k A. 
(U2) If KB k A then KB o A is equivalent to KB. 
(U3) If KB and A are satisfiable, then KB o A is satisfiable. 
(U4) IfbA=BthenKBoA-KBoB. 
(U5) (KBoA)AB/=KBo(AAB). 
(U6) IfKBoAbBandKBoBkAthenKBoArKBoB. 
(U7) If KB is complete then (KBoA) A (KBoB) b KBo (AV B). 
(U8) (KBI v KB;,) oA = (KBI oA) v (KB20A). 
A better understanding of the mechanism underlying update can be achieved by 
considering the possible worlds semantics described by Katsuno and Mendelzon, which 
they show to be equivalent to the postulates. For any proposition A, let 11 AlI denote 
the set of worlds satisfying A, Clearly, IlKBll re p resents the set of possibilities we are 
prepared to accept as the actual state of affairs. Since observation 0 is the result of 
some change in the actual world, we ought to consider, for each possibility w E JIKBI(, 
the most plausible way (or ways) in which w might have changed in order to make 0 
true. We will call such a change in any world an “evolution” of that world. To capture 
this intuition, Katsuno and Mendelzon postulate a family of preorders 
{<,: w E W}, 
where each <,+, is a reflexive, transitive relation over W. We interpret each such relation 
as follows: if u & u then u is at least as plausible a change relative to w (or an 
evolution of w) as is u. Finally, a faithfulness condition is imposed: for every world w, 
the preorder <,+, has w as a minimum element; that is, w <w u for all u # w. Intuitively, 
this ensures that w is itself more plausible than any other evolution of w. ’ 
Naturally, the most plausible candidate changes in w that result in 0 are those worlds 
u satisfying 0 that are minimal in the relation &,. The set of such minimal O-worlds 
for each relation &, and each w E IIKBII, intuitively capture the situations we ought to 
accept as possible when updating KB with 0. In other words, 
IlKBe 011 = u { T;{u: u I= 0)) ,
WEllKEll ’ 
where min<,,, X is the set of minimal elements (w.r.t. <,) within X. Katsuno and 
Mendelzon show that such a formulation of update captures exactly the same class of 
change operators as the postulates; thus, we can treat this as an appropriate semantics 
for the KM update theory. 
As an example, consider the following scenario illustrating the application of the KM 
update semantics to database update. We know certain facts about an employee Fred: 
his salary is $40,000, his job classification is level N, and so on. But, we are unsure 
whether he works for the Purchasing department or the Finance department. Thus, our 
KB admits two possibilities, w and u, reflecting this uncertainty (see Fig. 1). If the 
orderings <, and Go are as indicated in the figure, then KB updated with the fact that 
Fred’s salary is $50,000 contains, among other things, the facts Dept (P) V Dept (F), 
’ Katsuno and Mendelzon use the term persisfent to describe such orderings. 
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Fig. 1. An update model. 
Dept (P) I> Level(N) and Dept (F) > Level(N+l). This is due to the fact that the 
closest world to w with the new salary is w’, while the closest to u is v”; hence, KB 
is determined by the set of worlds {w’, u”}. This may reflect the fact that such a raise 
comes only with a promotion in Finance, whereas promotions are rare and raises more 
frequent in Purchasing. 
The KM: semantics shows very clearly one of the main distinctions between update 
and belief revision. In belief revision (e.g., using the AGM theory), if an observation 
0 is consistent with KB, then the revised KB * 0 must be equivalent to KB U (0). 
This needn’t be the case for update. Given KB as above, we may receive an update 
transaction 
0 E (Dept(P) > Sal(40)) A (Dept(F) > Sal(50)). 
While KB U (0) entails Dept (P), and is captured semantically by the set {w}, KB o 0 
corresponds to the set {w, u”} and does not commit Fred to a particular department. 
The crucial distinction is update’s willingness to consider the evolution of each possible 
world individually. Belief revision only considers the belief set KB as a whole. 
3. Update as explanation 
3.1. Plausible causes of observations 
The orderings upon which update semantics are based are interpreted as describing 
the most plausible manner in which a world might change. Given the role of update, 
this interpretation seems correct: worlds closer to w in the ordering Qw are somehow 
more plau:;ible states into which w might evolve. It seems reasonable then to update 
a KB by considering those most plausible changes. In our example above, if Fred is 
in Purchasing (world w), then a change of salary of this type is more likely to come 
without a change in rank (w’) than with a change in rank (w”). 
While reasonable, it begs the question: why would one change be judged more 
plausible than another? Intuitively, it seems that there are certain events or actions that 
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would cause a change in w, and that those leading to w’ are more plausible than those 
leading to w”. For example, the event RAISE might be more probable than the event 
PROMOTION (at least, in Purchasing). 
Given an observation Sa1(50000)-in this case an update transaction-an agent 
might come to believe Dept (P> 3 Level(N) (as we have in our example) as follows: 
assuming Dept (P>, the most plausible event that might cause such a change in salary is 
RAISE (rather than PROMOTION). Thus RAISE is the best explanation for the observation. 
Adopting this explanation has, as a further consequence, that job rank (and department) 
stays the same; thus, belief in Level(N) remains. In contrast, RAISE (to $50,000) 
is less likely than PROMOTION in the Finance department.2 Thus, PROMOTION is the 
most plausible explanation for the observation, which has the additional consequence 
Level (N+l). Thus, the two beliefs Dept (P> > Level(N) and Dept (F) > Level (N+l) 
hold in the updated belief state. 
This leads to a very different view of update. When confronted with an observation or 
update 0, an agent seeks an explanation of 0, in terms of some external event that would 
have caused 0 had it occurred. 3 While many events might explain 0 in this way, some 
will be more plausible than others, and it will be those the agent adopts. Given such 
an explanation, one may then proceed to predict further consequences of these events, 
and produce the set of beliefs arising from the observation. With this point of view, the 
essence of update is captured by a two-step process: (a) explanation of the observation 
in terms of some event(s) ; and (b) prediction of the (additional) consequences of that 
event. We do not presume that the agent has direct knowledge of the event occurrence. 
If such direct knowledge is available the problem becomes much simpler, for the agent 
can simply predict the effects of this event using some theory of action. This is a very 
specific update problem, restricting an agent to updating by observations of the form 
“Event E occurred”. No explanation is required. 4 
Before formalizing this idea, it is important to realize that this perspective is very 
natural. It is reasonable to suppose that an agent (or builder of a KB) has ready 
access to some description of the preconditions and effects of the possible events in a 
given domain. This assumption underlies all work in classical planning and reasoning 
about action, ranging from STRIPS [lo] to the situation calculus [20,24] to more 
sophisticated probabilistic representations [7,181. With such information, the predictions 
associated with explanations (event occurrences) can be easily determined. Furthermore, 
an ordering over the relative likelihood of possible events also seems something which 
an agent or system designer or user might easily postulate. This should certainly be 
easier to construct than a direct ordering over worlds according to their likelihood of 
“occurring”. Indeed, we will show that such an ordering over worlds is derivable from 
this more readily available information. 
’ In our example, we assume that a raise to $45,000 is most likely (world u’), but that a higher raise is 
unlikely without a promotion. 
3 In this paper we will usually think of (external) events as the impetus for change, rather than actions over 
which the agent has direct control (or of which the agent has direct knowledge). 
4 This assumption is embodied to a certain extent in the update models of de1 Val and Shoham [ 8.91 and 
Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 13 1, as we discuss in Section 4. 
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This provides a possible interpretation of the update process, and in our view, a very 
natural one. 5 Furthermore, as we describe in the concluding section (and in detail in 
[4]), by breaking update into two components, we will be able to extend the type of 
reasoning about action one can perform in this setting. 
Using explanation for reasoning about action has been proposed by a number of 
people, especially within the framework of the situation calculus. Work on temporal 
projection and prediction failures often exploits the notion of explanation. For instance, 
Morgens’tern and Stein [21] propose a model where an observation that conflicts with 
the predicted effects of an agent’s action causes the agent to infer the existence of some 
external event occurrence. Shanahan [26] proposes a model with a similar motivation, 
but adopts a truly abductive model (where candidate events are hypothesized rather 
than deduced from an observation). Our model will be rather different in several ways. 
First, explanations will be conditional (i.e., explaining events are conditioned on certain 
propositions). Second, the criteria used for adopting explaining events will be based on 
the relative plausibility of events. Third, we will not limit attention to any particular 
model OF action (such as the situation calculus). Finally, our goal is to show how 
explanation can account for the update of a knowledge base. We should point out that 
Reiter [ 2’51 (and personal communication) has informally suggested that update can be 
viewed a.s explanation to events causing an observation. We will proceed to show that 
this is, in fact, the case. 
3.2. A formalization 
To capture update in terms of explanation, we require two ingredients missing from the 
Katsuno--Mendelzon account: a set of events that cause changes, and an event ordering 
that reflects the relative plausibility of different event occurrences. 
We assume a finitely generated propositional language with an associated set of worlds 
W. Let E be a finite event set, the elements of which are primitive events. In general, 
e E E i:; a mapping e : W + 2w. For w E W and e E E, we use e(w) to denote 
the result of event e occurring in world w. This is a set of worlds, each of which is a 
possible outcome of e occurring at w. An event with more than one possible outcome 
is nondeterministic. A deterministic event is any e E E such that e(w) is a singleton 
set for each w E W. A deterministic event set is an event set all of whose events are 
deterministic. We assume that events are total functions on the domain W, so that every 
event cm be applied to each world. In addition, we insist that e(w) # 8 for each e, 
w. 6 We emphasize that not only are all possible outcomes of an event captured by the 
set e ( w) , but also that each world in e(w) is a legitimate, plausible outcome. 
-. 
s This sha>uld not be taken as a criticism of update for requiring that a reasoning agent have an explicitly 
specified f,lmily of prcorders at its disposal. One can reason about update with syntactic constraints or by any 
other means. The point is that, from a semantic point of view, the preorders and syntactic constraints seem to 
be induced by considerations about action effects and plausible event occurrences. 
6 It is best to think of events as analogous to “action attempts”. If the preconditions for the “successful” 
occurrence of the event are not true in a given world, then the effects can be null, or unpredictable or 
something like that. Allowing preconditions is a trivial and uninteresting addition for our purposes here. 
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Typically, events are not specified as mappings of this type. Rather, for each event 
(or action), a list of conditions are provided that influence the outcome of the event. 
For each such condition, a set of effects is specified. An example of this is the classical 
situation calculus representation of actions (in the deterministic case). Another is the 
modified STRIPS representation presented in [ 6,181. The key feature of these, and other 
representations, is that each action/event induces a function between worlds (or worlds 
and sets of worlds).’ Thus, most action representations will fit within this abstract 
model. While we do not delve into the representation of actions, our examples will 
suggest ways in which traditional representations can be augmented with the features of 
our model. 
As a further generalization, if events are nondeterministic, we might suppose that the 
possible outcomes are ranked by probability or plausibility. We set aside this complica- 
tion (but see [4] ). 
In order to explain certain observations by appeal to plausible event occurrences, we 
need some metric for ranking explanations. We assume that the events in the set E are 
ranked by plausibility; hence, we postulate an indexed family of event orderings 
over E. We take e &, f to mean that event e is at least as plausible (or likely to occur) 
as event f in world w. * 
We require that _i, be a preorder for each w, and will occasionally assume that 5w 
is a total preorder. Once again, we do not expect that this family of orderings will 
be presented explicitly. Compact representation schemes are possible. For example, in 
our database example we might suppose that a user can specify the constraint that a 
RAISE event is more plausible than a PROMOTION event for employees of the Purchasing 
department. The relative plausibility need not be asserted explicitly for each world 
satisfying Dept (P). 
We note that there are few restrictions on the relative plausibility of events in any 
given ordering &. The only structural basis for the logical comparison of events is 
through outcome sets, but these provide no logical constraints on relative plausibility. 
If we have two events e and f such that e(w) G f(w), we impose no constraints on 
the relative ordering of e and f in =X,,,. In particular, we cannot insist that an event 
e with fewer possible outcomes be judged more likely than an event f. For instance, 
imagine two events, Jlipping a coin and placing a coin, such that flipping results in two 
possible outcomes (heads, tails) and placing has three outcomes (heads, tails, edge). 
This provides no a priori reason to consider flipping or placing more likely than the 
other. 
Putting these ingredients together, we have the following definitions: 
’ In the case of the situation calculus, dynamic logic or other temporal formalisms, one would require some 
solution to the frame problem. For example, the solution of Reiter 1241 induces just such a mapping. 
x Other models of event orderings are possible, including using a fixed ordering for all worlds, or associating 
event plausibility with belief sets (or sets of worlds) rather than individual worlds. However, these seem less 
compelling. 
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Definition 1. An event model is a triple (w E, 3), where W is a set of worlds, E is a 
set of events (mappings e : W -+ 2w) and 5 is an indexed family of events orderings 
{ %I’: w s W} (where each 5, is a preorder over E). 
Definition 2. A deterministic event model is an event model where every e E E is 
deterministic (i.e., for all w E W, e(w) = {u} for some u E W). A total order event 
model is an event model where each event ordering z& is a total preorder over E. 
Given an event model, an agent is able to incorporate a new piece of information 
through a process of explanation and prediction as discussed above. An explanation of 
an observation is some event e that, when applied to the world under investigation, 
possibly causes 0. However, the agent should be interested only in the most plausible 
such events. 
Definition 3. Let 0 be some proposition and w E W. The set of weak explanations of 
0 relativ’e to w is 
ExpI(0, w) = rr$n{e E E: e(w) n ]]O]l # 0). 
-11, 
An event e is a weak explanation of 0 relative to w iff e E Expl(0, w). If Expl(0, w) = 
0, we say that 0 is unexplainable relative to w. 
In other words, e explains 0 in a world w just when there is some possible outcome 
of e that satisfies 0, and no more plausible event e’ has this feature. Such explanations 
are called weak explanations because, before the observation 0 is made, an agent would 
not, in general, be able to predict that 0 would result from e. The agent merely knows 
that 0 is true of some possible outcome. This is often the most we can expect in a 
domain with nondeterministic events. For example, someone tossing a coin onto a chess 
board is a quite reasonable explanation for the fact that the coin is on a black square; 
but knowing the event occurred is not enough to predict that outcome, for it might well 
have landed on a white square. 
A predictive explanation is similar, but we insist that each outcome of e satisfies 0. 
Definition 4. The set of predictive explanations of 0 relative to w is 
Explp(O,w) =mi%n{e E E: e(w) G IlOll}. 
An event e is a predictive explanation of 0 relative to w iff e E EqAp(O, w). If 
Explp (0, w) = 8, we say that 0 is not predictively explainable relative to w. 
The distinction between weak and predictive explanations is very similar to that made 
between consistency-based iagnosis [ 231 and predictive (or abductive) diagnosis [ 221. 
This distinction is illustrated in Fig. 2. Both e and f are nondeterministic events. Event 
e predictively explains 0, while f weakly explains 0 but does not predictively explain 
0. We alre interested here in weak explanations, for these seem most appropriate when 
dealing with nondeterministic events. However, we note the following: 
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Fig. 2. Weak and predictive xplanations. 
Proposition 5. If e is a deterministic event, then e weakly explains 0 iff e predictively 
explains 0. 
Corollary 6. If EM is a deterministic event model, 0 is weakly explainable iff 0 is 
predictively explainable. 
For a particular world w, Expl(0, w) denotes those most plausible events that could 
cause 0 to be true. The possibilities admitted by such a set of explanations are the 
possible results of each of these events. To determine these we simply evolve or progress 
w in accordance with these possible event occurrences; that is: 
Definition 7. The progression of world w given observation 0 is the set of worlds 
Prog(w 1 0) = u{e(w) f’ IlOll: e E Expl(0, w)}. 
Note that if 0 is unexplainable relative to w, then Prog(w 1 0) = 8. This means that 
there is no event (among those specified in the model) that could have caused w to 
evolve into a world that satisfies 0. The occurrence of 0 relative to w is impossible. We 
also note that if we restrict our attention to predictive explanations, or to deterministic 
event models, we can rewrite this definition as 
Prog(w ( 0) = U{e(w): e E Explp(O,w)}. 
Taking a cue from the Katsuno-Mendelzon update semantics, the progression of a 
knowledge base KB given a particular observation 0 is obtained by considering all 
plausible evolutions of each world w E IIKBII. H owever, if 0 is unexplainable for some 
w E (I KBll , we take 0 to be unexplainable relative to KB as a whole. 
Definition 8. The progression of KB given observation 0 is the set of worlds 
Prog(KB I 0) = u{Prog(w I 0): w E /lKBll}. 
If Prog(w I 0) = 8 for some w E IIKBII, we let Prog(KB I 0) = 0. 
The motivation for this last condition, that 0 must be explainable relative to every 
w E /lKBll, comes from the KM update semantics itself. In the KM theory of update, 
the updated KB is constructed by considering the possible evolution of every possibility 
admitted by KB. We duplicate this intuition by considering the progression function 
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Fig. 3. An event ordering. 
of every world in IlKBll. If no such evolution is possible for one of these worlds, we 
trivialize the result of updating KB. We might have allowed the progression of KB to be 
nontrivial even if some worlds could not evolve so as to satisfy 0, and define Prog( KB 1 
0) without this last condition. In other words, we might have considered Prog( KB 1 0) 
to be as in the definition, but simply accept, when Prog(w 1 0) = 0, that w contributes 
nothing to the construction of Prog(KB I 0). However, we adopt the current approach 
for two reasons. First, our goal is to pursue the analogy with the KM update semantics. 
Our definition is a direct adaptation. Second, dropping this restriction has implications 
for the relationship between belief revision and update. Simply excluding worlds whose 
progression is empty is, in effect, performing revision in addition to update. While this 
is generally a good idea, the correct way to bring together revision and update requires 
more drastic changes in the way update is performed. We elaborate on this in Section 4. 
We take: progression of KB to be the semantic counterpart of the update of the 
theory KB. With such a progression function, we can now define the explanation-change 
operator relative to a given event model, which determines the consequences of adopting 
an observation. 
Definition 9. The explanation-change operator induced by an event model EM is OEM: 
KB OFM 0 = {A E Lcp~: Prog( KB ( 0) k A}. 
In our example, we have two event types, Promotion and Raise. A PROMOTION event 
(promotion of one level) ensures an employee’s rank is increased and his salary is raised 
$10,000. Events RAISE(5) and RAISE(I0) raise salary $5000 and $10,000, respectively. 
We assume the following event orderings for each department: 
Purchasing: RAISE(10) 4 PROMOTION 4 FlAISE(51, 
Finance: FLAISE(5) 4 PROMOTION + FUISE(10). 
This is illustrated in Fig. 3, where shorter event arcs depict more plausible occurrences. 
The explanation relative to Purchasing is a raise, while for Finance it is a promotion. 
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The updated KB’ is determined by w’ and v” and induces the beliefs described earlier. 
As another example, imagine that a warehouse control agent expects a series of 
trucks to pickup and deliver certain shipments, but at time tl an expected truck A has 
not arrived. Assume that this might be explained by snow on Route 1 or a breakdown. If 
snow is the most plausible of the two events, the agent might reach further conclusions 
by predicting the consequences of that event; for example, trucks B and D will also be 
delayed since they use the same route. The proper explanation and subsequent predictions 
are crucial, for they will impact the agent’s decision regarding staffing, scheduling and 
so on. Notice also that such explanations are defeasible, which is reflected in the 
defeasibility of update: if A is late but B is on time, then snow is no longer plausible 
(therefore, e.g., D will not be delayed). 
Finally, we can formalize our initial example. We first adopt a conditional STRIPS-like 
representation of events, using variables to schematically capture a set of propositions, 
and take each event specification to induce the obvious transformation on possible worlds 
(see, e.g., [ 6,181). We have two possible events, RAIN and SPRINKLER, with effects as 
follows: 
Event Condition Effect 
RAIN 
SPRINKLER 
On(grass,x) 
On(patio,x) 
else 
On(grass,x) 
else 
Wet(x) , Wet (grass), Wet (patio) 
Wet(x) , Wet (grass), Wet (patio) 
Wet (grass), Wet (patio) 
Wet(x) , Wet (grass) 
Wet (grass) 
We also have the proposition 0 asserting that it is overcast, and influencing the plausi- 
bility of these two events. A plausibility ordering might be given as follows: 
If 0 then RAIN 4 SPRINKLER, 
If 70 then SPRINKLER 4 RAIN. 
Our agent’s knowledge base consists of the beliefs 
{O,lWet(book),On(patio,book) E -Inside(book)}. 
Given the fact 0 (overcast), the most plausible explanation for the observation 
Wet (grass) is RAIN. The effect is then Wet (book) if On(patio,x) and TWet (book) 
if Inside(book). Note that had it not been overcast, SPRINKLER would have been the 
most plausible explanation and our agent would rest assured that her book is dry. 
We should remark at this point that the intent of this model is to provide an abductive 
semantic model for update, not a computational model. Just as we do not expect actions 
or events to be represented as abstract functions between worlds, explanations will not 
typically be generated on a world by world basis. Usually, the same event will explain 
an observation for a large subset of the worlds within llKBl[. In particular, we expect that 
IIKBJI to be partitioned according to some small number of propositions (or conditions) 
for which a certain event is deemed to be a reasonable explanation. Indeed, these can 
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naturally be viewed as conditional explanations, for example, “If Fred is in Finance, 
a PROMOTI:ON must have occurred; but otherwise a RAISE must have occurred”. How 
such conditional explanations should be generated will be intimately tied to the action 
or event representation chosen, and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.3. Relationship to the Katsuno-Mendelzon theory 
We are interested in the question of whether the explanation-change operator satisfies 
the KM update postulates. This is not the case given the formulation above. 
Proposition 10. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some event 
model. Then OEM sutis$es postulates (Ul ), (U4), (U6) and (U7). 
There are two reasons why the remainder of the postulates are not satisfied in general, 
hence two assumptions that can be made to ensure that OEM is an update operator. 
The firslt difference in the explanation-change operator is reflected in the failure of 
(U2), which asserts that KB o A is equivalent to KB whenever KB entails A. A simple 
example illustrates why this cannot be the case in general. Consider a KB satisfied by a 
single world w where w b A. Postulate (U2) requires that the observation of A induce 
no change in KB. However, it may be that the most plausible event in the ordering 5w is 
e, where e(w) = {u} for some distinct world o. But if we assume u b A, then KBOEMA 
is captured, by u and is thus distinct from w. In order to conform to postulate (U2), we 
must make the assumption that no change in w is more plausible than change induced 
by some event. Formally, we postulate null events and make these most plausible. 
Definition 11. The null event is an event n, where n(w) = {w} for all w E W. 
Definition 12. Let EM = (Wr E, 3) be an event model. EM is centered iff the null event 
n E E and, for each w E W and e E E (e # n) we have n -& e. 
Thus, a centered event model is one in which the null event is the most plausible 
event that #could occur in any world. This seems to be the crucial assumption underlying 
postulate (U2). 
Proposition 13. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some centered 
event model. Then OEM satisjies postulates (Ul), (U2), (U4), (U6) and (U7). 
This assumption of persistence of the truth of KB seems to be reasonable in many 
domains, but should probably be called into question as a general principle. It may be 
the case in a domain where change is the norm that, despite the fact that an observation 
is already believed, some change in KB should be forthcoming. As an example, consider 
an agerit monitoring a control system producing some product. It observes a display 
that indicates whether the system is proceeding normally. If it believes that a normal 
condition is displayed before the next observation, observing that the display (still) 
indicates normal should not require that its other beliefs not change: it may, for instance, 
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update the number of units produced in response to this observation. In this sense, the 
more general nature of the explanation-change operator may be desirable. 
Postulate (U3) is also violated by our model, and for a similar reason, so too are (US) 
and (U8). For a given KB, we may have that Prog(w j 0) = 8 for each w E (IKBII. In 
other words, there are no possible events that would cause an observation 0 to become 
true. The potential for such unexplainable observations clearly contradicts (U3), which 
asserts that KB o 0 must be consistent for any consistent 0. The assumption underlying 
(U3) in update semantics seems to be the following: every consistent proposition is 
explainable, no matter how unlikely. In order to capture this ~sumption, we propose a 
class of event models called complete. 
Definition 14. Let EM = (u! E, 5) be an event model. EM is complete iff for each 
consistent proposition 0 and w E W, 0 is explainable relative to w. 
Proposition 15. If EM is a complete vent model theta Prog(KB 1 0) # 0 for any 
consistent 0 and K3. 
This condition is sufficient to ensure (US) and (US) are satisfied as well. 
~positio~ 16. Let OEM be the ~p~a~atiun-change op rator induced by some ~um~lete 
event model. Then OEM satisfies p~stuiates (III), (U3), (U4), (IX), (U6), (U7) and 
uJ8). 
The completeness of an event model refers, in fact, to the completeness of its event 
set E. If this set is rich enough to ensure that, for every world and observation, some 
event can make that observation hold, then the event model will be complete. Typically, 
domains will not be so well behaved. Nowever, the simple addition of a miracle event 
to an event set will ensure completeness. Intuitively, a miracle is some event which is 
less plausible than all others and whose consequences are entirely unknown. 
Definition 17. Let EM = (W, E, -C) be an event model. A miracle is an event m such 
that m( w> = W for ail w E W, and e -& m for all w E W and e E E (e + m). 
Proposition 18. Let EM = (W, E, 5) be an event model, If E contains a miracle event, 
then EM is complete. 
If all observations must be explainable, and no observation is pe~itted to force an 
agent into inconsistency, then miracles are one em~d~ment of the required ~sumptions. 
The reasonableness of such a requirement can be called into question, however. Having 
unexplainable observations is, in general, a natural state of affairs. Rather than relying on 
miraculous explanations, the threat of an inconsistency can force an agent to reconsider 
the observation, its theory of the world, or both. As we will see in the concluding 
section, it is just this type of inconsistency that can force an agent to revise its beliefs 
about the world prior to the observation. Update postulate (U3) makes it difficult to 
combine update with revision in this way. 
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If we put together Propositions 13 and 16, we obtain the main representation result 
for explanation-change. 
Theorem 19. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete, 
centered event model. Then OEM satisfies update postulates (Ill) - (U8). 
A useful perspective on the relationship between explanation-change and update comes 
to light when one considers that the plausibility ordering on events quite naturally induces 
an indexed family of preorders of the type required in the Katsuno-Mendelzon update 
semantics. 
Definition 20. Let EM = (W E, 5) be an event model. The plausibility ordering induced 
by EM, for each w E W, is defined as follows: v <,,, u iff for any event e, such that 
u E e,(w) , there is some event e, (where v E e,(w) ) such that e,, & e,. 
Intuitively, the more plausible some causing event e, for world v is (relative to w), 
the more plausible evolution v of world w is deemed to be (according to <,) . 
Theorem 21. Let {<,: w E W} be the family of plausibility orderings induced by some 
complete, ‘centered event model EM. Then: 
(a) Each relation <,,* is a faithful preorder over W. 
(b) The change operation determined by { <,: w E W} is a KM update operator. 
(c) The update operator determined by {<,: w E W} is equivalent to the 
explanation-change operator OEM. 
We note that if the event model is not centered then the generated preorder is not 
necessarily faithful. If the model is not complete, then we have only a restricted form of 
faithfulness. It will be the case that w <w u for any world v that is a possible evolution 
of w (i.e., if v E e(w) for some e E E). However, those worlds that cannot result from 
the application of some event to w will be unrelated to w. In this case, we can say that 
<,&. is faithful relative to the connected component of <,+ that includes w. Intuitively, we 
want to ignore those worlds that are not “reachable” from w. To do this we can simply 
define an update operator using the relation Gw restricted to such worlds: 
{u: v E e(w) for some e f E}. 
This ensures that unrelated worlds are not trivially minimal in the ordering relation <,. 
If we have an event model where each event ordering is a total preorder, then the 
induced plausibility orderings over worlds are also total preorders. 
Proposition 22. Let EM = (u! E, 3) b e a complete event model such that & is a total 
preorder for each w E W. Then each plausibility ordering <,,, induced by EM is a total 
preorder. 
The circumstance where a set of events is totally preordered by plausibility may arise 
rather frequently; for instance, events may be ranked according to some integer scale, 
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or assigned some qualitative probability ranking. Therefore, the properties of such total 
update operators are of interest. We can extend the Katsuno-Mendelzon representation 
theorem to deal with update operators of this type. The required postulate embodies 
a variant of the principle of rational monotonicity, cited widely in connection with 
nonmonotonic systems of inference and conditional logics (see, e.g. [ 3,191). 
(U9) If KB is complete, (KBoA) F -B and (KBoA) b C then (KBo(AAB)) k C. 
Theorem 23. An update operator o satis+es postulates (Ill)-(U9) ifs there exists an 
appropriate family of faithful total preorders { &: w E W} that induces o (in the usual 
way). 
Corollary 24. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some total order 
event model. Then OEM satisjies postulate (U9). 
Indeed, Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 161 also discuss the possibility of totally ordered 
plausibility rankings and provide a postulate (U9) related to the one above, and the 
proof of equivalence is similar to that suggested by them (see also their work on total 
orders for belief revision [ 171) . 
As a final remark, we note that the converses of Theorems 19 and 21 are trivially 
and uninterestingly true. For any update operator o, one can construct an appropriate set 
of events (and orderings) that will induce that operator. This is not of interest, since 
the point of explanation-change is to provide a natural view of update, characterizable 
in terms of the events of an existing domain. The ability to construct such events to 
capture a particular update operator provides little insight into update. The appropriate 
perspective is to reject any update operator (in a given domain) that cannot be induced 
by the existing set of events (or event model). 
4. Concluding remarks 
We have provided an abductive model for incorporating into an existing belief set 
observations that arise through the evolution of the world. While our model allows more 
general forms of change than KM update, we can impose restrictions on our model to 
recover precisely the KM theory. However, these restrictions are inappropriate in many 
cases, calling into question the suitability of some of the update postulates. 
4.1. Relationship to belief revision 
It has frequently been suggested that abduction can be modeled by appeal to belief 
revision [ 121. Boutilier and Becher [ 51 present a model of abduction along these lines, 
whereby an explanation for an observation 0, with respect to some KB, is a sentence E 
such that KB * E entails 0. In other words, had an agent believed the explanation E it 
would have believed the observation 0. 
The abductive view of update suggests that update may also be viewed as a form of 
belief revision. Since explanations take the form of event occurrences, an interpretation 
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using belief revision takes update to be the process of an agent revising its beliefs about 
whether an event occurred and just what that event was. For instance, in our main 
example the observation Sal(50000) can be viewed as causing an agent to give up its 
belief that no event has occurred (i.e., the world has not changed) and accept the fact 
that something has happened-in particular, it accepts the belief 
Dept (P> > Occurred( RAISE (10) ) A Dept (F) > Occurnxf( PROMOTION). 
Of course, we have not provided an explicit logical language for the representation of 
actions or events, and in particular, have not provided a method for revising beliefs about 
such occurrences. However, there are a number of ways to model this type of belief 
revision, including using histories or runs of a system as our basic semantic objects. A 
run is essentially a sequence of world states capturing a particular evolution of a system. 
Using these as semantic primitives one can capture beliefs about the actual state of the 
world in addition to event occurrences. While not directly suited to our task, the revision 
model of Friedman and Halpern [ 111, in which runs are ranked in manner suitable for 
belief revision, is precisely the type of system upon which a more elaborate model of 
update, revision and explanation can be built. 
When viewed in this way, certain problems with the update model, as formulated by 
Katsuno ,and Mendelzon and recast here, become apparent. The types of explanations 
one is willing to consider are restricted to event occurrences. In other words, an agent is 
bound to revise its beliefs only about possible event occurrences and their consequences. 
Thus, an agent making an observation is not allowed to entertain the possibility that its 
knowledge base KB was incomplete or incorrect. It can only change its beliefs about 
the post-twent world state. Semantically, this restriction is apparent in our definition of 
update (as well as Katsuno and Mendelzon’s). We require that every w E l/KBll be 
progressed according to likely explaining events. 
It is just this restriction that calls into question the suitability of update as a “stand- 
alone” belief change operator. Of particular concern, as emphasized earlier, is postulate 
(U3). This embodies the assumption that all observations are explainable in terms of 
some event. This is not always reasonable. For instance, in our database example we 
might have a transaction to update Fred’s salary to $90,000 when there is a salary 
cap of $80,000 in Finance. Thus, no event could have caused this salary change if 
Fred is indeed in Finance. Far from being a miraculous occurrence, it suggests that 
Fred is actually in Purchasing. Thus the observation not only forces KB to be updated 
(reflecting a change in the world), but also revised (reflecting additional knowledge 
about the world). 
Note that this is not an artifact of our definition of update; one might argue that we 
should simply update those worlds for which explanations exist and ignore the others. 
This minor adjustment seems reasonable, but it is no longer simply update. Rather 
it is a combination of update and revision. Furthermore, observations may often be 
unexplainable for every world in (IKBII. F or instance, suppose a solution is believed 
to be an acid, when a litmus strip is dipped into it and promptly turns blue. This is 
not explainable for any KB-world (it should turn red) in terms of event effects. As 
such, the minor adjustment of our definition of update is not sufficient. We may want 
to update KB consistently in circumstances where no possible event could give rise to 
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the observation given our current state of belief. Instead, the intuitive explanation in this 
example consists of two parts: the first postulates that the event of dipping the paper 
in the solution occurred; the second suggests that the solution is in fact a base. This 
requires revision of KB-we must change our beliefs about the pre-event state of the 
world in order to modify KB correctly. 
Finally notice that an observation need not be strictly unexplainable to force revision. 
Often an implausible explanation will suffice. For instance, a raise to $90,000 might not 
be impossible in Finance, but just so implausible that the database is willing to accept 
the fact that Fred is in Purchasing. To adequately reflect such considerations, we must 
have the ability to compare the plausibility of event occurrences with the plausibility of 
beliefs about the world state. This provides further support for more expressive models 
and languages in which event occurrences can be reasoned with explicitly. 
Issues of this sort make postulate (U3) (and certain aspects of (U5) and (U8)) 
somewhat questionable, and provides motivation for adopting an abductive view of 
update. This perspective is especially fruitful when combining the process of update 
(changing knowledge) with belief revision (gaining knowledge). A model that puts both 
components together in a broader abductive framework is described in [4]. Roughly, 
the logic for belief revision set forth in [ 21 is used to capture the revision process, but 
is combined with elements of dynamic logic [ 141 to capture the evolution of the world 
due to action occurrences. 
4.2. Related work 
Other have presented models of update that, like ours and unlike the KM-model, 
have their basis in reasoning about action. Del Val and Shoham [ 8,9], using the sit- 
uation calculus, show how one can determine an update operator by reasoning about 
the changes induced by a given action. Very roughly, when some KB is to be up- 
dated by an observation 0, they postulate the existence of some action A2;8 whose 
predicted effects, when applied to the “situation” embodied by KB, determine the form 
of the update operator. Most critically, the effect axiom for such an action states that 
0 holds when A:’ is applied to KB, and other effects are inferred via persistence 
mechanisms. 
This model differs from ours in a number of rather important ways. First, de1 Val 
and Shoham assume that the update formula 0 describes the occurrence of some action 
or event. This severely restricts the scope of update, which in general can accept arbi- 
trary propositions. They provide no mechanism for explaining an observation using the 
specification of existing actions. In order to deal with arbitrary observations an action 
is “invented” for the purpose of causing any observation in any situation. Naturally, the 
effects of such new actions are not specified a priori in the domain theory. So they 
propose that the effect of invented actions is to induce minimal change in the knowl- 
edge base according to some persistence mechanism. However, the plausible cause of an 
observation 0 may carry with it, in general, other drastic (rather than minimal) changes 
in KB. This can only be accounted for by explaining an observation in terms of existing 
actions. A persistence mechanism is required primarily because existing action or event 
specifications are not employed. 
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Another drawback of this model is its failure to account for the possibility that any 
of a number of actions might have caused 0, and that update should reflect the most 
plausible of these causes. Finally, there is an assumption that the update of KB is due 
to the occurrence of a (known) single action. As we have described above, this will 
usually not be the case. Conditional explanations, explanations that use different actions 
for different “segments” of KB, will be very common. 
A relalted mechanism is proposed by Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 131, who use qualita- 
tive causal networks to represent an action theory. Again, update formula are implicitly 
assumed to be propositions asserting the occurrence of some action or event. An ob- 
servation 0 is incorporated by assuming some proposition do( 0) has become true, and 
using a forced-action semantics to propagate its effects. Explanations are not given in 
terms of existing actions. 
We should point out that both proposals adopt a theory of action that provides a rep- 
resentation mechanism for actions and effects, as well as incorporating a solution to the 
frame problem (implicitly in the case of Goldszmidt and Pearl). We have side-stepped 
such issues by focusing on the semantics of update. We are currently investigating var- 
ious action representations, such as STRIPS and the situation calculus, and the means 
they provide for generating conditional explanations. This is partially developed in [ 41, 
where we provide a representation for actions using a conditional default logic to cap- 
ture the clefeasibility and nondeterminism of action effects, and use elements of dynamic 
logic to #capture the evolution of the world. Action theories such as those exploited in 
[ 8,131 might also be used to greater advantage. 
Appendix A. Proofs of main results 
Proposition 10. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some event 
model. Then OEM satisfies postulates (Ul ), (U4), (U6) and (U7). 
Proof. Assume an event model M = (u! E, 3) and associated update operator o (for 
simplicity we drop the subscript). We show in turn that each of these postulates is 
satisfied. 
(Ul) By definition Res(A,w) C ]jAjl for all w (hence for all w E \lKBll). Immedi- 
ately we have KB o A k A. 
(U4) Suppose b A = B. Then e explains A w.r.t KB iff e explains B, for any event 
e. Thus, KBoA = KBoB. 
(U6) Suppose KBo A + B and KB o B b A. Then we have Res(A,KB) C l[Bll 
and Res(B,KB) & [\A\[. If u E Res(A,KB), then for some w E [IKBll we 
have a most plausible explaining event e for A such that u E e(w). However, 
since u E )I BIJ, e must also be a most plausible explaining event for B as 
well; otherwise there must exist some more plausible event f 4 e that explains 
B, contradicting the fact that e is most plausible for A (since Res( B, KB) s 
IJAIl). Therefore, u E Res(B,KB), so Res(A,KB) C Res(B,KB). By symme- 
try the reverse containment holds, so Res(A, KB) = Res( B, KB) and we have 
KBoA s KBoB. 
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(U7) Let KB be complete so that llKBl[ = {IV} for some world w. Suppose v E 
Res(A, w) n Res(B, w). (If there is no such v then (KB o A) A (KB o B) 
is inconsistent and (U7) holds trivially.) Then there is some e such that 
u E e(w) and e is a most plausible explaining event for both A and B. 
This ensures that e explains A V B and that v E Res( A V B, w). Hence, 
Res(A,w) flRes(B,w) G Res(AVB,w). Therefore, (KBoA)A(KBoB) b 
KBo(AVB). 0 
Proposition 13. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some centered 
event model. Then OEM satisfies postulates (Ul), (U2), (U4), (U6) and (Ui’). 
Proof. Given Proposition 10, we need only show that (U2) is satisfied by centered 
event models. Assume that M = (W, E, 3) is such a model, inducing update operator o 
(for simplicity we drop the subscript). Suppose KB b A. Then for each w E l/KBll, we 
have w b A; and the null event is the most plausible explaining event for each such 
world. Thus Res(A, KB) = /lKBll and KBo A is equivalent to KB. Cl 
Proposition 16. Let OEM be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete 
event model. Then OEM satisjies postulates (Ul), (U3), (U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and 
(U8). 
Proof. Given Proposition 10, we need only show that (U3), (US) and (US) are satisfied 
by complete models. Assume that M = (u! E, 5) is such a model, inducing update 
operator o (for simplicity we drop the subscript). 
(U3) Since M is complete, any satisfiable A is explainable for every w. So if KB is 
satisfiable, Res( A, KB) # 8 and KB o A is satisfiable. 
(U5) Let v E Res(A,KB) 0 llB[l (if there is no such v, then (U5) holds trivially). 
Then for some w E l[KBll there is a most plausible explanation e for A 
(w.r.t. w) such that v E e(w). This event e must also be a most plausible 
explanation for A A B w.r.t. w (otherwise some more plausible event would 
explain A A B, hence A). Thus v E Res(A A B, KB). Notice that since A A B 
must be explainable for every world, we cannot have that Res(A A B, KB) 
is set to the empty set. Thus, Res(A, KB) n l[Blj C Res(A A B, KB) and 
(KBoA)AB ~KBo(AAB). 
(U8) Assume that KBl V KB2 is satisfiable. We have w E Res( A, KBI V KB:!) iff 
there is some v E IlKBl V KB 2 11 such that w E Res( A, v). Such a v is either in 
IIKBt II or IlKB;?II~ so this holds iff w E Res(A, KBI) U Res(A, KB2). Therefore, 
(KB,vKB2)oA=(KBIoA)V(KB20A). 0 
Theorem 21. Let {<,: w E W) be the family plausibility orderings induced by some 
complete, centered event model EM. Then: 
(a) Each relation <II, is a faithful preorder over W. 
(b) The change operation determined by {<,: w E W} is a KM update operator. 
(c) The update operator determined by {<,: w E W} is equivalent to the 
explanation-change operator OEM. 
C. Boutilier/Art@cial Intelligence 83 (1996) 143-166 163 
Proof. Let w be some world in a complete, centered event model EM = (W E, 5), and 
let &I be an induced ordering. 
(a> 
(b) 
cc> 
That <,+ is reflexive and transitive follows immediately from the definition Gw 
in terms of the event ordering 5, and the fact that 3,+ is itself reflexive and 
transitive. Hence <,,, is a preorder. Since null action n -& e for all e + n and 
n( IV) = {w}, we have w -& u for all u # w (if u E e,(w) for some event e,). 
Thus <, is faithful. Finally, since EM is complete, for any u there is some e, 
such that u E e,,(w) . Thus <,,, is persistent. 
The representation theorem of Kastuno and Mendelzon ensures that the family 
of orderings {<,: w E W} generates an update operator satisfying (Ul)-(U8). 
Denote by o the update operator generated by {<,: w E W}. We will show that 
KB o A E KB OEM A for any consistent KB and A. Assume u E l[All. We have 
u E IlKBoAll iff u E 
U{ 
n$n{u: u + A} 
wEllKull 
iff for some w E ~~KB~~, if u Gw u, then u p A 
iff for some w E llKB/j and event e, u E e(w) and 
for all e’ +w e, we have e’(w) n l[All = 0 
iff for some w E 11KBl1, u E Res(A,w) 
iff u E Res(A, KB) 
iff u E IlKBo All. 0 
Proposition 22. Let EM = (W, E, 3) be a complete vent model such that &, is a total 
preorder for each w E W. Then each plausibility ordering & induced by EM is a total 
preorder. 
Proof. Theorem 21 ensures that <,+ is a preorder. For any world u, let e, denote any 
event that has outcome u relative to w; i.e., u E e,(w) (such an event must exist since 
EM is complete). Consider two worlds u and u. Suppose u & u. Then there must be 
some e, such that for all e,, e, SW e,. Since =Xw is a total preorder, e, $,,, e, for all 
such e,,; and u Gw u. Thus, <,,, is a total preorder. 0 
Theorem 23. An update operator o satisfies postulates (Ul )-(U9) ifs there exists an 
appropriate family of faithful total preorders { &: w E W} that induces o (in the usual 
way). 
Proof. Wle first assume a suitable family of preorders. The representation result of 
Katsuno and Mendelzon ensures that the induced update operator o satisfies (Ul)- 
(U8). We now show that it also satisfies (U9). Let KB be complete with \lKBll = {w}. 
Suppose KBo A p 7B and KBo A k C. Let min(A) denote the set ming,{u: u k A}. 
Then we ‘have min(A) G l[Cll an d min( A) n II BII # 0. Since &,, is a total preorder, 
min(AA B) z min(A) fl llBl[ c IlCll, 
so KB o (A A B) k C. Therefore (U9) is satisfied. 
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Now we suppose o satisfies postulates (Ul) -(U9). To prove that a suitable family of 
orderings exist, we adopt the basic technique of Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 151. However, 
the orderings are constructed in a rather different fashion to ensure that the preorders 
are total. As preliminary notation, for any set of worlds X, we write @x to denote some 
sentence such that ((Ox]] = X. To emphasize that this will be the object of revision, we 
write KB{,) instead of @{,+,l. We note that (Ul) and (U3) ensure that KB{,)o@x E @x! 
for some X’ c X. We will also make use of the fact that @x! k @X for any X’ C X. 
We can now define a family of ordering relations based on o as follows: 
u <, 24 iff u E JJKB{,) 0 @{L,,l(l )I. 
We first show that Gw is a faithful persistent preorder. Clearly, <,+* is reflexive, since 
(Ul ) and (U3) ensure that u E IIKBi,l o @I,,) 11. Similarly, at least one of u or u 
is in IIK&,,) 0 @{~I,ujIIy so either u <,+, u or u G&f u. It is easy to verify that 6, is 
faithful and persistent due to (U2) and (U3). It simply remains to verify that <, is 
transitive. So suppose u <, u and u <,+. t. This ensures that u E IIKB{,l o @{lZ,ul ]I and 
u E IIKB{w} 0 @(f&t) Il.
(a) Suppose KB{,) o @{L,,u,r) = @frl. Then 
K&,,,) 0 @{lI,u,t) I+ +{u.f) and KB{,) 0 @{L~,u~t) I= @tt). 
By (U9), 
K&%3} 0 (@{P,&,} A @{u,r>) + @{2} 9
or equivalently 
KB{,} 0 @{&I} I= @{I}. 
But this contradicts the fact that u E ]IKB{,l 0@{~,~1]]. 
(b) Suppose KB{,,.) 0 @{U,U,t) F +fU) and K&,1 0 @+,q b l@{tl). Then 
KB{w} 0 @{Iw,t} F ‘@{LW} and KB{,) 0 @{,,U,t) k Q(U). 
By (U9), 
KB{,} 0 (@{,V&t> A @{1’,U}) + @{u,t} 9
or equivalently 
KB{,} 0 @{P&} + @{l&r). 
But this contradicts the fact that u E (IKBf,l~@f~,,~l ]I and u 6 I]@{u,tl]]. Thus, if 
u E IlK&} 0 @{“,I&,} II then u E llK&w) o@~,u,t~ll. 
By (a) and (b), we know that KB{,I o@{,,,,,,l is not equivalent to @I~}, @fuI or @{,,,I. 
Thus, u E II&+,1 0 @‘{U,u,tlll. 
Now by (US) we have (KE{,,,} o @{o,u,tI) A @{,,,l k KB{,l o @fu,tl. Since u E 
IIKBf,) o @{l,,L,,f) II, this conjunction is consistent, thus u E ]]KB{,l o @{u,tl I]. Therefore 
u <, t and & is transitive. 
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Finally, we demonstrate that 
IlKBoA = u {mh{u: u FA}}.
wEIWII ’ 
The remainder of the proof follows closely that of Katsuno and Mendelzon, but we 
include it for completeness. We assume KB and A are consistent, for the relations hold 
trivially otherwise. We first show that this relation holds for any complete KB. Assume 
IIKBII = {WI. W e use min(A) to denote the set of minimal A-worlds in <,,,. 
Suppose u /= KB o A but u $! min( A). Then there is some u <,,, u such that u k A. 
By (U5), (KBoA) A@{,,,,) k KBo@{,,); and by definition of <,, KBo@{,,,,) E CD(~). 
But then v ‘# KB o A. So u must be in min(A). Thus, IlKB o AlI C min( A). 
Now suppose u E min(A). Let l/All = (~1,. . .,u,}. We have that 
A = @+,u,) V . . . V @{u,u,,). 
And since u < ui for each i < n (since u E min(A)), we have u E IlKB o cD{~,,~~) II for
each i < 13. That is, u satisfies 
(KBo @{L>,u,)) A. . . A (KBo@{w,,j). 
By (U7), u therefore satisfies 
KB 0 (@{I,,uj 1 V . . . V @{cw,, 1) . 
That is, u E IIKBoAll. Therefore, min(A) C IIKBoAll. 
The result holds for any complete KB. However, any KB is equivalent to the disjunction 
of some finite set of complete KBs. Thus, by (U8) we have 
IIKBoAll = U {yin{,: ~+a)). 0 
WEllKBll “” 
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